There have been two projects that considered SecureInformationFlow in Orc: Adrian's work below and John's work at https://www.cs.utexas.edu/~jthywiss/Secure-Information-Flow-Orc.pdf

!! Presentation

See attachments.

!! Bibliography

! Survey

;Smith, 2006:''G. Smith. [Principles of Secure Information Flow Analysis|http://www.cs.fiu.edu/~smithg/papers/sif06.pdf]. 2006.''

;Zdancewic, 2003:''S. Zdancewic. [Challenges for Information-flow Security|http://www.cis.upenn.edu/~stevez/papers/Zda04.pdf]. 2003.''

;CS 711 Syllabus:''A. Myers. Syllabus for CS 711: Language-Based Security and Information Flow. http://www.cs.cornell.edu/andru/cs711/2003fa/. Thu Nov  6 16:44:19 CST 2008.'' Good bibliography of relevant work.

;Sabelfeld & Myers, 2003:''A. Sabelfeld, A. Myers. Language-based information-flow security. IEEE J-SAC, 2003.'' Survey paper of language-based approaches, with focus on static verification.

! Background

;Lampson, 1973:''B. Lampson. A note on the confinement problem. CACM, 1973.'' Originally identified the so-called __confinement problem__, which generalizes to SIF.

;Denning & Denning, 1977:''D. Denning, P. Denning. Certification of programs for secure information flow. CACM, 1977.'' Originally framed information flow security in terms of non-interference and provided simple static verification method.

;Volpano & Smith, 1997:''D. Volpano, G. Smith, C. Irvine. A sound type system for secure flow analysis. J. Comp. Sec., 1997.'' Presented Denning & Denning's method as a type system which captures security context elegantly via "command" types.

! Hot Stuff

;Zheng & Myers, 2007:''Lantian Zheng, Andrew C. Myers. Dynamic Security Labels and Static Information Flow Control. International Journal of Information Security, 6(2-3), March 2007.  Springer.'' Dynamic labels are necessary for real-world applications.  We should consider applying this to Orc, although this is mostly orthogonal to concurrency.

;Bossi et al, 2007:''A. Bossi, C. Piazza, S. Rossi. Compositional information flow security for concurrent programs. Journal of Computer Security 15 (2007) 373-416.'' Formalize a compositional notion of non-interference based on bisimulation. This looks like an excellent formal basis for timing-sensitive information flow security for Orc.

;Zdancewic & Myers, 2003:''S. Zdancewic, A. Myers. Observational determinism for concurrent program security. CSFW'03.'' Prove security through race freedom of low-level variables. Looks interesting although I liked ~[Bossi et al, 2007] better.

;Pottier & Simonet, 2002:''F. Pottier, V. Simonet. [Information flow inference for ML|http://portal.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=503302]. 2002.''